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I . Introduction
The 1964 Civil Rights Act explicitly prohibits employers from
engaging in any hiring, job assignment, promotion practice or any other
employment practice which treats members of one race or sex group dif-
ferently from another and which resiJ-ts in a disparate impact on the
affected group's wages or employment opportunities. Since the passage
of the Act, a number of major U.S. Supreme Court decisions have followed
which have inteipireted, in legal terms, what is considered a discrimina-
tory employment pattern or practice. The most important ruling in this
regard, applicable to all types of employment practices, excluding
seniority systems, is the Griggs v. Duke Power Company decision in 1971.
With this decision the Court set the following standards for determining
if an employment practice is unlawfully discriminatory.
An employment practice that has a significantly disparate effect on
"blacks' or women's wages or employment opportunities is considered dis-
criminatory even if the practice is "neutral on its face and in terms of
intent." The Gilggs rule for determining a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation requires that the complainant only show that a regular post-Act
employment practice or pattern has a disparate impact on the affected
class. In this landmark decision, the Court ruled that it was not
necessary to prove intent to discriminate on the part of the employer who
instituted such a practice if "it operates to freeze the status quo of
2
prior discriminatory employment practices." Only if the employer can
show that the practice is a business necessity will it be considered
legally permissible. Thus, for example, a qualification for a promotion
which disproportionately excludes black or women employees from consideration
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must be shown to be a valid, job-related credential or skill necessary for
adequate performance on the job in order for that qualification not to be
considered an unlawfully discriminatory piractice
.
In the recent case of Teamsters v. United States et al. , the Supreme
Coiirt provided an exception to the Griggs 2rule in considering the question
of what may be a discriminatory versus a bona fide seniority system. In
this case, evidence of a significant disparate effect on minority or women
workers was not considered a sufficient standard by which to determine
whether or not there is a prima facie case of discrimination. Rather,
the Court ruled that seniority provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ments enjoy a special status in the law. Section 703(h) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act explicitly exempts differences in treatment of
employees that result from the application of a bona fide seniority system
from being considered unlawfiol "if such differences are not the resiilt of
an Intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
3
national origin." Nowhere in the Act, however, is defined what is meant
by a bona fide seniority system. Thus, that determination has been left
up to the courts. In the Teamsters ruling in 1977. the Supreme Court
declared that seniority systems that are neutral on their face and in
their intent, even if they have significant disparate impacts on women
and minority employees, may be considered bona fide. In order to establish
that a seniority system is discriminatory, a complainant must show evidence
that the system is not neutral on its face or in its intent.
The Court's ruling in this case is a narrow one. It does not resolve
the general question of when a seniority system may be considered discrimi-
natory, that is, what the rules of evidence are for determining that it is
not neutral on its face or in its intent. Thus, in the wake of Teamsters v.
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United States et al.
,
there is still considera'ble controversy as to what
is an unlawfully discriminatory seniority system.
This paper presents an analysis of the patterns of race and sex dis-
crimination in one industrial plant. The general question of how the
seniority system affects the wages and employment opportunities of women
and minority workers is explored in this analysis. Indeed, I propose a
set of indicators which distinguish among the different structural charac-
teristics of the seniority system in order to separate what may be unlawful
discriminatory effects from those that have a disparate impact on women and
minority workers but may not be considered illegal by the court's ruling
in the Teamsters case
.
The plant-specific data on workforce characteristics, wages, and job
structure and the seniority system itself are company generated data pro-
vided me by union sources. For reasons of confidentiality, any references
to the identity of the plant, the employer, or the union in question have
been obscured. The case, however, can be assumed to be representative of
mass-production plants in an industry with a long history of employing
women and blacks in blue-collar work. Thus, if discrimination exists, it
cannot be attributed to the exclusion of these groups from entry, but
rather to the operation of discriminatory mechanisms within the plant's
"internal labor market."*
The complex of issues raised by an analysis of how a seniority system
may have disparate effects on women and minority workers, only some of
which may be considered legally discriminatory, requires that I utilize
*By "internal labor market" I mean the formal and informal mechanisms by
which workers are allocated to jobs at different wage levels within an
establishment
.
those economic and sociological theories of discrimination that take into
account the institutional processes by which wages and employment oppor-
tunities are determined for the individual in a particular establishment.
In the first section of this paper, I discuss economic and sociological
theories of discrimination that seem appropriate for this type of analysis.
The second section presents a description of the data. The third section
describes the variables used to test for the effects of different aspects
of the seniority system. The empirical model developed here is based on
a job competition, structuralist view of the wage determination process
within an industrial plant. In the fourth section, I present the results
of the estimation of that model using ordinary least squares multiple
regression techniques. The final section of the paper discusses the im-
plication of these findings and the areas where futvire research may prove
most enli^tening on the questions left unresolved by this type of analysis.
II . Labor Market Theory and Discrimination
For the U.S. economy as a whole, Marcia Freedman has characterized
the relatively poorer and unstable economic position of women and black
workers compared to white men in the labor force as a consequence of their
exclusion from those labor market segments which provide employment
stability and relatively higher wages. In her view, "the modal activity
that occurs in the labor market is not competition among individuals, but
bargaining among groups." High wages accrue to those groups who are best
able to gain for themselves protective job shelters with restrictive entry
arrangements. Individuals who are unfortunate enough not to be able to
gain entry to existing shelters, or who are unable, in fact, to develop
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their own shelters in consort with other unprotected workers, will suffer
from emplojrment instability and relatively low wages—the vagaries of a
competitive labor market—compared to those who have access to the
sheltered segments of the labor market.
Protective shelters are institutionalized arrangements designed to
restrict entry and regulate earnings. Freedman gives the example of
licensing arrangements for certain occupational groups, such as elec-
tricians. Without a license, an individual cannot practice a certain
trade. Union hiring hall arrangements, where union membership is a pre-
requisite for employment in certain occupations or industries, are another
type of restrictive sheltering mechanism. A third type, that of the estab-
lishment with a highly structured internal labor market, restricts compe-
tition to entry level positions only. In a unionized workplace of this
type, access to higher wage positions is regiLLated by a seniority system.
Within the establishment, jobs are arranged in hierarchically structured
promotion ladders. Workers with more years of plant-specific experience
are given preference over less senior workers for promotions to high wage
jobs in the firm's internal labor market. The case that is analyzed in a
later section of this paper involves the operation of just such a highly
structured internal labor market
.
Similar in some respects to Freedman' s more sociological analysis of
labor market behavior, Lester Thurow's "job competition" model describes
individual, rather than group, behavior in the labor market. Like
Freedman, he does not subscribe to the view that individuals compete for
hi^er wages on the basis of their personal characteristics, but rather,
he says, individuals search for jobs that represent high wage and rela-
tively stable or secirre employment opportunities. In his model, wages
are attached to job characteristics, not to the characteristics of indi-
viduals. In the absence of the active creation of new protective shelters,
the search behavior of individuals in Thurow's job competition model seems
consistent with Freedman's analysis.
To Thurow, "labor skills do not exist in the labor market," but
rather, they are acquired, in most cases, after a worker has been hired
and assigned to an entry level job. That position is attached to a specific
promotion ladder within the firm. One important purpose of these non-
competitive promotion ladders is to encourage the transmission of socially
held knowledge and skills from the more senior to junior workers. If the
two were competitors, and promotions were not rewarded on the basis of
seniority, the more experienced woiker, in all probability, would be quite
reluctant to share the knowledge and skills he/she has acquired with someone
who is viewed as a potential threat to his/her own wages and job security.
In the job competition model of the labor market, workers compete only for
entry to desirable jobs in the protected segments.
Hiring Discrimination.
Hiring discrimination is one way in which women and black workers may
be excluded from entry to the employment opportunities within a highly
structured internal labor market. Employers' direct refusals to hire an
applicant because of his/her race or sex, in light of Title VII prohibitions,
are rare occurrences today. More frequently, qualifications for entry and
the availability of acceptable black and female candidates are cited as the
reasons for exclusion. Hiring discrimination occurs when employers rely
on education credentials, test scores, height and weight requirements, or
other qualifications which disproportionately screen out black or female
applicants for consideration from employment. In an enterprise where skills
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necessary to perform a job are usually acquired in on-the-job training,
potential employees may be selected on the basis of a variety of ascriptive
traits that bear little relationship to actual job performance but are used
as convenient screening devices by managers to distinguish what are thought
of as the "better" candidates from the overall applicant pool. When
employers use screening criteria that disproportionately exclude black
or female applicants from consideration and which cannot be shown to be
directly related to job performance, then hiring discrimination is said to
occur.
Another form of hiring discrimination occurs through the process of
recruitment. As mentioned previously, Thurow has described labor market
behavior as the search for jobs with some measure of employment security
and high wages. A unionized workplace with a highly structured internal
labor market is one example of where these desirable jobs may be found.
Access to information about entry-level job openings in such workplaces
may be restricted to an informal network of incumbent employees, their
families and friends. In a study conducted during the late 1960's on the
hiring and promotion practices of firms characterized as having highly
structured internal labor markets, Peter Doerlnger and Michael Piore
found that informal recruitment networks were the norm, rather than the
Q
exception, among these establishments.
If the incumbent workforce is predominantly white or male, then
reliance on them as informal channels of communication to potential
applicants may perpetuate past patterns of discriminatory hiring practices.
The applicant pool which results from that recruitment process may under-
reparesent the availability of potentially acceptable black or female
candidates. Women and blacks who may be interested in these jobs simply
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woiild not have been told about them because either they are not part of
that informal network, or, if they are. Informants may not consider the
available openings appropriate for them. The case presented here is not
one where blacks and women have been completely excluded from entry.
Indeed, there are a few black and female employees in the plant who
entered that workforce as early as the 19^0's. Thus, hiring discrimina-
tion of the form described above is less likely to be the cause of unequal
treatment . Rather, other forms of discrimination in the initial job
assignment practices, or job evaluation techniques, and in the process
by which promotions occur within and across job ladders within the firm
are the more likely sources of unequal treatment.
Discriminatory Practices within the Internal Labor Market.
Doeringer and Piore's monograph on the analysis of internal labor
market operations provides the most complete description of how employ-
9
ment practices within an industrial plant may be racially discriminatory.
Mary Stevenson has extended their analysis to include the unequal treat-
ment of women. Within a highly structiired internal labor market like
that which occurs in unionized manufacturing plants, there are four types
of discriminatory practices that may adversely affect both black and female
workers: l) initially, upon hire, in the form of discriminatory job assign-
ment practices; 2) by wage discrimination, as a result of sex or race biases
in job evaluation techniques; 3) by unequal treatment in promotions within
parti ciilar job ladders; and 4) through unequal access to promotion oppor-
tunities across the plant.
Wage Discrimination . The wage structure in an industrial plant of
this type is usually fixed; that is, there are a limited range of different
wage levels for all possible production jobs in the plant. Jobs are assigned
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to slots or labor grades in the wage schedule on the basis of some kind
of ranking system. Individual jobs are "evaluated" relative to other jobs
in the plant. According to Doerlnger and Pi ore, jobs that have histoiri-
cally been considered appropriate for black workers may be undervalued by
such a ranking system. Black jobs, they contend, have in some cases only
been compared to other black jobs, and not to jobs filled by whites, even
though some black jobs may be comparable to white jobs in terms of skills
or tasks. Indeed, Doeringer and Piore cite cases in which white workers
were found to be doing the same tasks as black workers but in two dif-
12ferent jobs in the same plant. The jobs were not evaluated the same,
and therefore not paid the same. This is wage discrimination.
Similarly for women, job classification schemes that have histori-
cally distinguished so-called women's jobs from men's in categories such
as "light" versus "heavy" assembly work may also be discriminatory.
Women's jobs may be undervalued if they are compared only to other women's
jobs in the firm. Job evaluation techniques applied to all jobs in the
plant but which systematically give lower weight to factors associated
with women's production jobs will result in an under-rating of those jobs
13
compared to men's. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in a
number of recent cases, has begun to explore the extent of sex biases in
job evalviation techniques used by employers. It is EEOC's contention that
biased techniques are discriminatory employment practices under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act.
Wage discrimination as described above is not to be confused with the
notion of equal pay for equal work. The jobs that women or black workers
hold may not be the same as the ones that men or white workers hold. Wage
discrimination refers to historic sex and lace biases in the wage determi-
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nation process itself, where jobs associated with black and female workers
have been treated differently and unequally when compared to other jobs in
the plant. The continued post-Act use of biased techniques translates
into the perpetuation of lower wages for these job holders.
Discrimination in initial job assignment practices. Upon hire, women
and blacks may be assigned to entry level positions that represent unequal
wage and employment opportunities compared to the jobs to which white men
are initially assigned. Doeringer and Piore cite as an example the case
of black men who were always initially assigned to an undifferentiated
Ik
Common labor pool at the bottom of the hieiarchy of jobs in a plant.
Some white men, on the other hand, were regularly assigned directly to jobs
which constituted entry level positions in promotion ladders over the common
labor pool. The fact that it was a regular practice to assign only newly
hired white men to these positions makes this an example of discriminatory
job assignment practice
.
Similarly, Stevenson gives an example of a workplace where women were
initially assigned to promotion ladders whose entry level wage was lower
than that of the entry level jobs to which men were exclusively assigned
in other promotion ladders. Of course, the extreme case of totally
sex-segregated or race-segregated job assignment practices—even if there
are no differences in wages, i.e., "separate but equal" classifications
—
is also illegally discriminatory.
Assignment practices which result in substantially segregated entry-
level jobs may have consequences beyond the immediate discriminatory effect
of reserving certain entry-level jobs for white men only. If the race and
sex segregated job ladders to which blacks and women have been assigned
are also truncated at the low end of the wage structure, then they do not
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represent the full range of wage possibilities available in the plant.
If, in addition, promotion practices within the internal labor market
unduly restrict movement across job ladders, then women and blacks may be
denied access to the higher wage opportunities available in other promotion
ladders in the plant . Even if the truncated ladders are substantially
desegregated by new hires, the discriminatory effect of the initial
assignment practices remains for those more senior women or black em-
ployees who are unable to move out of these short ladders.
Truncated race or sex-segregated ladders are not the only enduring
type of discriminatory assignment practice . In the case where newly hired
black or female workers have been assigned to only a limited number of the
available job ladders in the plant, they may also suffer some long-range
discriminatory effects from that initial assignment practice. Suppose all
promotion ladders contain the same number of jobs, that these jobs extend
to the full height of the wage structure in the plant, and that progression
rates are the same within each ladder. If black or female workers are
disproportionately assigned to only a few ladders and they are restricted
from lateral transfers to other promotion ladders, then it follows that
they are less likely than white or male workers in the plant to be pro-
moted to the highest wage jobs. The phenomenon of "crowding"—that is,
the higher concentration of blacks or women in relatively few ladders
—
will, over time, result in unequal promotion opportunities for black or
female workers compared to white or male workers who are not so constrained.
Discriminatory promotion practices. Formal seniority provisions always
include clauses that define the importance to be attached by managers to
seniority status when weighed against other factors in making promotion
decisions. Generally, one can distinguish between a "weak" and a "strong"
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seniority clause . A weak clause states that a personnel manager or
foreman must give preference to the more senior of two equally qualified
candidates. Thus, the decision-maker is given the option of choosing
whom he/she may think is a more qualified candidate for a promotion over
a more senior but ostensibly less qualified competitor. A strong clause
is one in which seniority is supposed to be given greater weight than
qualifications in promotion decisions. Thus, for example, a contract may
requiire that the manager give preference to the worker with the most
seniority if he/she can meet only the minimum qualifications necessary to
learn the job. In this case, the only qualification required for the
promotion is evidence that the most senior individijal in line for the
promotion is capable of learning how to do the job within a designated
break-in period.
Local union officials and local company managers administer these
contract provisions. They are the formal riiles by which the seniority
system operates. Informally, years of experience or seniority within a
designated unit may be traded off by decision-makers against other, more
subjective factors, which can and do inject some flexibility (but also
arbitrariness) into the administration of seniority rules regarding pro-
motions. Nevertheless, within any particular seniority unit one would
not expect to find that black or female workers per se are significantly
less likely to be promoted to higher wage jobs if they have the same
seniority status as white or male workers in the unit. When those
"subjective factors" are sex or race-related, that constitutes prima facie
evidence of discrimination.
Unequal access across job ladders. The seniority system in a unionized
workplace formally regulates movement within and across job ladders. There
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are three salient featirres of seniority systems that relate to the question
of whether or not unequal access across promotion ladders may mean that the
seniority system itself is discriminatory. These are: l) what the structure
of the seniority unit classification scheme looks like; 2) how narrowly or
broadly seniority is defined for promotions and layoffs; and 3) whether
there are any penalties for moving from one seniority unit classification
to another within the plant.
A seniority unit is that relevant cluster of jots or joh ladders in
which a person's seniority status matters, or according to the contract,
must be given weight by personnel managers or foremen who make decisions
regarding promotions or layoffs. In some workplaces, the relevant unit
is the plant. In that case, all promotion ladders belong to the same unit.
Alternatively, a workplace may be characterized by a departmental classi-
fication scheme. Each department in the plant (e.g., the foundry, the
machine shop, the final assembly department) is considered a separate
seniority unit. Another type of seniority unit is the "job-sequencing"
promotion ladder. In this type of classification scheme, seniority units
are occupationally-related job clusters that may be plant-wide or depart-
ment-wide. Thus, in one plant, for example, all the painters would be in
the same seniority unit no matter where they're located. Alternatively,
the painters in one department and the painters in another might constitute
separate seniority units. Plant-wide, departmental and job-sequencing
seniority units as discussed above are the most commonly observed
17
classification schemes found in collective bargaining agreements.
Discriminatory hiring practices cannot lead to segregated job ladders
no matter what the classification scheme unless there are formal or informal
restrictions on mobility between job ladders. In collective bargaining
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agreements, formal restrictions result from narrow definitions of the
relevant seniority status for promotions and layoffs or from contract
provisions that penalize transfers between seniority units. Seniority
status is usually defined in one of three ways for promotions and layoffs:*
l) years of service within the "bargaining unit as a whole, i.e., plant-
wide seniority status; 2) years of experience within a department, i.e.,
departmental seniority status; and 3) years of experience within a par-
ticular job, i.e., job seniority status. In some agreements, the defini-
tion of seniority status is simply consistent with the type of classifica-
tion scheme in place. Thus, for example, in a plant with a departmental
classification system in which seniority status is defined as years of
experience within a particiolar department, an individual in one depart-
ment would have no seniority status in any other. In this case, even
without any formal restrictions on transfer rights between units, there is
a penalty imposed on anyone who transfers to a job in another department.
He/she loses seniority protection as a result of that move and may be
treated as a new employee in the event of a layoff, or may be required
to start at the bottom of the job ladder in that department, depending on
how important seniority status is considered in these personnel decisions.
In other agreements, seniority status may be more broadly defined,
*In many collective bargaining agreements, seniority status is defined
differently for promotions than it is for layoffs. Thus, for example,
in the same contract, in the event of a layoff, years of service with
the company, or within the bargaining unit, rather than years of experience
in a particular job, may be the relevant definition; whereas, for promo-
tions, years of experience in a particular job may be what counts. Simi-
larly, in the event of a layoff, an individual with more years of service
with the company may be able to "bump" a less senior worker out of his/her
job in another unit. Yet with regard to promotions to higher-rated jobs
in another unit, his/her seniority status may not be considered.
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tut there are formal restrictions on mobility between units.* Thus, for
example, seniority may be defined as years of service with the company, or
within the bargaining unit, but seniority units are classified along de-
partmental or occupational lines. Restrictions on transfer rights in the
agreement may say that an individual who transfers from one unit to another
cannot carry his/her seniority status with him/her. Thus, the transferring
employee is treated as a new hire with no seniority status whatsoever in
the new unit he/she has moved to. This penalty may be permanent or only
temporary, that is, the contract provision may allow for an individual to
regain his/her lost seniority status if he/she is able to stay in that new
job for a certain period of time (e.g., a year) without being laid off.
Penalties of this sort make it very risky for an individual to transfer
from one unit to another in the same way that a more narrow definition
of seniority status would. A seniority system can be said to provide
unequal access to all job opportunities for some workers, irrespective of
their race or sex, if: a) the structure of the system embodies a depart-
mental or a job-sequencing type of classification of mobility clusters;
and b) seniority status is defined in other than plant-wide terms, i.e.,
along job or departmental lines; or c) there are penalties or restrictions
on transfers between seniority units within the plant. A seniority system
has a disparate impact on black or female workers if it provides unequal
access to all the job opportunities available in the plant and there has
been an initially discriminatory job assignment practice
.
Otherwise, departmental or job-sequencing seniority unit classification
schemes would be meaningless.
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Dlscrimlnatory v. Bona Fide Seniority Systems.
The Supreme Court ruling . According to the Supreme Court's decision
in Teamsters v. United States et al
.
,
a seniority system may have a disparate
impact on black or female employees and still be considered bona fide . In
this case, the Court outlined what factors distinguish a bona fide system
from a discriminatory one. In brief, a seniority system enacted after the
Civil Rights Act came into effect on July 2, 19^5 is considered bona fide
if it:
a) has a unit classification scheme that is rational and consistent;
b) applies equally to all race, ethnic (and sej^ groups;
c) did not have its genesis in racial (and sexual) discrimination;
d) was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal
discriminatory purpose
.
A seniority system enacted before the effective date of the Civil Rights
Act cannot be considered bona fide if it "perpet\;ates the effects of pre-
Act discrimination" and "if an intent to discriminate entered into its
. .. .,19
very adoption.
A unit classification system is considered "rational" in the Court's
eyes, if it follows normal industry practices, that is, if it follows a
commonly accepted departmental or occupational clustering of jobs in the
plant. By "consistent," the Court means with reference to the National
Labor Relations Board rulings regarding what it considered an appropriate
bargaining unit.* The Court is silent on the questions of what constitutes
*In the Teamsters case, one of the questions before the Court was whether or
not the separation of two different types of drivers into different bargaining
units and, therefore, separate union locals was legitimate or not since the
company had only hired minority drivers into one type of drivers' job and
not the other. Generally, workers in one bargaining unit have a separate
agreement with the company and do not have collective bargaining rights with
respect to jobs in another bargaining unit, or local union. In the context
of a discriminatory hiring practice which excluded minorities from one bar-
gaining unit, the question before the Court was whether or not minority workers
in one local union should be given transferrable seniority rights to jobs under
the jvirisdiction of another local union.
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proof of intent to discriminate and how one might infer discriminatory-
purpose in the maintenance or continued operation of a seniority system.
Discriminatory intent in the inception of a system. Where the Supreme
Court has been silent, the EEOC has not. In light of Teamsters , the EEOC
has developed its own rules of evidence as to what constitutes "discrimi-
natory" intent in the inception or maintenance of a seniority system.
According to the Commission, "discriminatory intent in the institution of
a seniority system," formulated along departmental lines or job-sequencing
promotion ladders, can be inferred if the "units we2?e previously segre -
?0
gated ." In addition, if the company has indulged in a discriminatory
job assignment practice among seniority units within a bargaining unit,
then the contract provisions which penalize transfers from one unit to
another are also unlawfully discriminatory. In other words, it is EEOC's
position that the Teamsters ruling only exempts as a bona fide practice
the special case where employees belong to separate locals, or bargaining
units, generally do not have transferrable seniority rights between the
two units, and where there has been no history of discriminatory treatment
within the bargaining units.
Discriminatory intent in the maintenance of a system. Discriminatory
intent in the maintenance of a seniority system can be inferred, says the
Commission, if the "employer or union is made aware that it is locking in
minorities or females" and the system is maintained or renegotiated when
21
an alternative (non-discriminatory) system is available." Charges filed
with federal or state anti -discrimination agencies and grievances filed by
employees, which allege that the seniority system as it operates is dis-
criminatory, are the ways in which the employer or the union can be expected
to have known, or been "made aware" of the problem. Thus, if they continue
-18-
to operate the existing system without modification, then intent to dis-
criminate can he inferred hy their actions. Informal promotion practices,
which may even violate the formal seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement can also he considered evidence that the seniority
system—as it actually operates—discriminates against women and minorities.
Information about job openings and the procedures for actually applying
for a promotion can occur throiigh an informal system of communication, vis-
a-vis the "grapevine," i.e., by talking with co-workers and supervisors
about what they know about job openings elsewhere in the plant. In some
cases, contract provisions may include a formal job posting arrangement,
by which the personnel office is required to post information about openings
at different bulletin boards in the workplace. In order to be considered
for a promotion, eligible individuals may be required to speak to the
hiring foreman directly or go to the employment office of the personnel
department and fill out a formal application.
Job posting provisions that are restrictive, i.e., posting only in
certain departments, or in relatively inaccessible places, or postings
that list only certain types of openings, may have a de facto discrimina-
tory effect if they deny information about job openings elsewhere in the
plant to blacks or women confined to substantially segregated job ladders.
Indeed, where there are no job posting arrangements, a woman or black may
hear that there are no job openings for her/him. Thus, if women or blacks
with high seniority status are not told about potential openings, they
effectively cannot outbid low seniority males or whites for those jobs.
Similarly, if the application process is a highly informal one and there
is little monitoring by union officials to ensure that seniority provisions
are indeed being followed, then, in the absence of a strong affirmative
-19-
action commitment by management, previously discriminatory practices are
likely to continue
.
The EEOC will consider a seniority system to be informally operating
in a discriminatory manner if evidence is shown that; a) women or blacks
are being denied access to information about openings outside the job
ladders to which they have been discriminatorily assigned; and b) they
have protested this fact to union or company officials in the form of
grievances or forne.1 charges of discrimination filed with an outside agency.
Alternatively, discriminatory intent can also be inferred if: c) women or
blacks are disproportionately being denied promotions they apply for,
given that they have the same seniority status as men or white employees;
and again if d) there is evidence that individuals so affected have
formally protested this treatment.*
EEOC and the Court; some conclusions. Fundamentally, the Supreme
Court and the EEOC agree that in order for a seniority system to be con-
sidered discriminatory, it must first be shown that black or female
employees do not get the same returns, in terms of promotions to higher
wage jobs, for the same years of seniority when compared to men or white
workers in the same bargaining unit. This is one type of proof of disparate
effect. Evidence of current or past discriminatory job assignment practices
within the bargaining unit is another. The structure of the seniority
unit classification system then needs to be examined to see if substantial
race or sex segregation by job ladder exists. If so, then the seniority
*In the context of a past history of discriminatory job assignment prac-
tices, the Commission may require that the company show that it has
provided alternative training opportunities through which women or blacks
can qualify for higher rated jobs, if, in fact, the segregated job ladders
to which they had been confined had little or no training associated with
them.
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system is discriminatory as far as EEOC is concerned. If the current
seniority system is no longer segregated, but had "been so in the past,
and if blacks or women still do not have equal access to high-wage
opportunities "because they have been unable to move out of low-wage
seniority units, then EEOC says the seniority system itself and any
contract provisions restricting mobility can be considered discriminatory.
Indeed, EEOC goes even further to suggest that the informal operation of
the seniority system may show it to be discriminatory, independent of what
the contract says.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Teamsters v. United States et al . does
not contradict the Commission's view that discriminatory intent can be
inferred from a past history of segregation within the bargaining unit,
or from evidence that the current classification scheme is substantially
segregated. The Court, however, does take a second look at the structure
of the seniority system to see if there is a rational application of a
departmental or job-sequencing classification scheme in operation. The
standard the Court applies in Teamsters suggests that if the classification
scheme is irrational and substantially sex or race segregated, then there
is proof that the seniority system from its inception was intended to
discriminate. Doeringer and Piore give an example of just such a case
where
:
"apparently efficient training sequences (were) being
interrupted to limit the advancement opportunities ofp
persons in the lower-paying job classifications..."
These authors observe that the separated job ladders were segregated, with
the low paying classifications going to blacks and the high paying ones to
whites.
It is not apparent from the language of the Teamsters decision if the
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Court meant that this condition applied only to the special case "before
it (that of two bargaining units) or whether the Justices intended to set
a more general standard. If so, a more general application would imply
that a seniority system must be shown to be "irrational" or "inconsistent"
(the Court's terms) in addition to being segregated in order to infer that
it is unlawfully discriminatory.
For systems enacted before the effective date of the Civil Rights
Act, the Court is quite clear on one point, at any rate. There must be
evidence that employment opportunities have arisen after the passage of
the Act, and that blacks or women have been disproportionately excluded.
If no new hires or promotions have occurred since July 2, 1965 > then despite
proof that the pre-Act seniority system was set up to discriminate, and
indeed even remains segregated after that date, it is exempt from the law.
Ill . Case Description
For the specific case I have been studying, information on contract
provisions and the history of the collective bargaining relationship
between the employer and the union was gathered from published sources
and from internal union documents. The workforce data were generated
from company personnel records which were provided to the union in the
course of its contract negotiations with that employer in 1976. The data
base applies to the entire plant's production workforce employed as of
March 1976. For each worker, information was available on: date of hire,
current job title, hovirly wage rate, seniority unit classification, and
his/her race and sex. For comparative purposes, the wage distributions
of the December 1972 workforce were also available, but only by sex, not
race.
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Workforce Characteristics
In March 1976, seven hundred and fifty workers were employed in blue-
collar production jobs at the plant. Table 1 shows the race and sex
composition of the workforce at that time. As is evident in this table,
women constituted about thirty-five percent of the total number of pro-
duction workers; black workers of both sexes made up seventeen percent;
and fifty-three percent of those employed at that time were white men.
Table 1; Sex and Race Composition of the 1976 Workforce
Men Women Total
White 398 222 620
Black 86 44 130
Total 484 266 750
Tiarnover from voluntary quits, retirements or deaths had been quite
low over the preceding three-year period: ninety-four percent of those
employed at the end of 1972 were still on board in 1976. There is no
evidence that women or blacks exhibited higher rates of turnover than
white males during this period.
There was, however, substantial employment growth during these years.
Approximately two hundred and thirty more individuals were employed as of
March I976 than had been employed in December of 1972. Thus, the 1976
workforce was nearly one and a half times as large as that employed at
the end of 1972.
Sixty-seven percent of all new hires since Jan\3.ry 1, 1973 were non-
minority males. In fact, some forty-two percent of the overall male work-
force employed in 1976 were hiired since that date, whereas over seventy-eight
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percent of the female workforce had been hired before 1973 • Indeed, by
1976, women had on the aveiage accumulated one and a half years more
continuous work experience than men. Nevertheless, women—and black
—
workers both averaged about six percent lower wages per hour than men and
white workers, respectively.''^
Figure 1 illustrates promotion paths for each sex and race group in
the plant. The paths shown here are plots of expected wages as a function
of years of experience in the plant, controlling for race and sex differences
23in initial levels and in progression rates. As expected, wages of all
workers increase with experience, but there are clear differences among
the subgroups. Women get a much lower wage upon hire (i.e., with zero
experience) than men do. And the maximum attained return to experience is
lower for blacks than for whites.
In addition to their higher initial wage, white men progress at a
slightly faster rate, such that the women are never able to make up that
initial difference. Indeed, the wage gap between white men and women
widens with increased experience. White women also start at a lower
initial wage than black men, but progress at a faster rate until even-
tually, after twenty years, they catch up to them. After that point,
white women experience greater returns to experience than do black men.
For black men and women, not only do they start at a lower wage than
their white counterparts, but their promotion paths are flatter and shorter.
Thus, for example, black women start at a lower initial wage and make
smaller wage gains for each additional year of experience when compared
*See tables A-1 and A-2 in the appendix for the means and standard
deviations of wages and years of experience, respectively, for each
race and sex group.
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Figure 1: Representative Promotion Paths by Sex and Race
wage
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years of experience
denotes the limit on returns to years of experience.
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to white women. After she has accumulated some twenty-one years of service
in the plant, there are no more gains associated with additional experience
for a tlack woman. Both white men and white women continue to receive returns
in terms of higher wages, for additional years of experience until they
have accumulated over thirty years in the plant. For black men and women,
however, their marginal returns from experience cease after twenty-two
years
.
From the above description, one can see that it is quite likely that
black workers have had a distinctly different set of promotion opportunities
over a smaller and lower range of wage levels than those of white workers
in the plant; and, at the very least, white women have suffered from an
initial disadvantage, compared to white men, from which they never re-
covered. One needs to turn to an analysis of the seniority unit classi-
fication system and the seniority rules themselves to see how promotion
opportunities facing all workers have been structured, in order to deter-
mine if these differences resvilt from unequal access to high-wage job
ladders or other factors.
Internal Labor Market Structujre
In this plant, all production workers are covered by the same collec-
tive bargaining agreement, and are all potential members of the same local
union.* The local is an affiliate of a national union, and the plant is
one of several operated by a multi -plant employer. The company and the
union have a national agreement which includes provisions that state the
^Theoretically speaking, not all of the workers employed in the plant may
be required to be union members; however, the union does have a "modified
union shop" agreement with the employer that requires all new employees
to join the union within thirty days from their date of hire.^'^
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general principles by which seniority status is determined and how strongly
seniority is to be considered by management with regard to promotions and
layoffs. The local union negotiates its own supplement to the national
agreement, specifying how the general provisions apply to this plant. The
local can negotiate specific seniority unit classifications and restric-
tions on transfer rights but the seniority clauses of the national agree-
ment cannot be modified by a local agreement in any way.
Unlike a craft-type union organization, this industrial, non-referral
type union characteristically has had no formal say in the hiring and
25
initial job assignment decisions nBde by management. In addition, the
organizing principles of the national union have historically emphasized
that all non-managerial employees in the workplace sho\£Ld be included in
the same bargaining unit and that there be no special distinctions made
between more and less skilled workers in their collective bargaining
rights. In some of the plants in this industry, there are in fact plant-
wide seniority systems in effect, but in many others, there are not.
There is simply no consistent industry-wide pattern.
In the national agreement between the company and the union, effective
from 1973-76, there was a "strong" seniority clause which stipulated:
"In all cases of transfers and upgradings to fill open
jobs, accumulated length of service will govern if the
employee's experience, although not necessarily in the
same type of work, indicates that he(she) can do the job.*
Service or seniority status, was defined in the contract to mean years of
continuous service with the company. The contract fiorther stated that
all skills needed to adequately perform the job were expected to be learned
on the job. Only under exceptional circumstances (e.g., in the event of
*This provision and that which defines seniority status have been included
in the national agreement with the company since 1950.
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unforeseen and rapid technological change) might the employer be justified
in filling a non-entry level position from outside the incumbent workforce.
There are twenty-seven different seniority units in the plant and
over one hundred different job titles. The 1973-76 local supplementary
agreement restricted transfers between units, and there were no provisions
for job posting and job bidding procedures plant-wide.* Thus, workers can
be assumed to enter at the bottom of a seniority unit and progress on the
basis of years of experience in the plant to higher wage positions within
that unit. Only rarely would one expect to find lateral transfers occurring
across units.
Within the plant, seniority units seem to vary along a number of
important dimensions. There are differences in the wage levels of entry
positions, the heights of promotion ladders, the sex and race compositions
of the units, and how densely populated the units are. Figure 2 illustrates
the structure of the wage opportunities associated with the -various units.
There are no seniority units that extend over the full range of the wage
opportunities available in the plant. Some units only include jobs at
one or two wage levels, and others include jobs at as many as seven dif-
ferent levels, extending over a total of twelve of the fifteen potential
levels in the plant's overall wage structure. Even job ladders with the
same "ceilings" can have different "floors."
The relative size of the seniority unit's membership is another im-
portant characteristic that distinguishes its wage opportunities. Promotion
*The exact nature of the restriction on transfer rights across units in
the plant is not known. However, during the 1973-76 contiact period, the
national union had urged its local affiliates to negotiate plant-wide
systems of job bidding and job posting in order to remedy any discrimina-
tory treatment that might have occurred in the past. I have no evidence
that this local changed its agreement accordingly in 1976.
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ladders may be of the same height and have the same entry level wage, but
vary in the number of people vying for promotions at lower levels within
the unit. More densely populated units can be expected to be more pyramid-
like than less dense units with the same range of wage opportunities. Thus,
being in a less dense unit with a higher entry level wage and a taller
ladder should mean an individual assigned to such a unit has a better
chance at getting a high wage job, ceteris paribus
,
than someone who is not.
If a seniority system is to be considered discriminatory, then there
must be some evidence of race or sex segregation in the plant. In this
case, in 1976, thirteen of the twenty-seven units had no women at all
assigned to them, and seven had no black workers. There were only three
units (all of them low-wage) from which white men were completely excluded.
In addition to these three totally segregated and low-wage units, there
were six other units that could be considered substantially segregated,
i.e., with more than a fifty percent black or female membership. These
numbers suggest that the classification system is indeed a highly segre-
gated one, which may provide unequal promotion opportunities for blacks
and women. In fact, seven of the eight lowest wage units in the plant
(starting from the left, in figure 2) were found to have more than a
sixty percent black or female membership.
The seniority system in the plant was enacted some time before the
effective date of the Civil Rights Act. In the Teamsters ruling, the
Supreme Court requires that even if a pre-Act seniority system was dis-
criminatory on its face or in its intent, there still must be sufficient
evidence of regular post-Act employment and promotion decisions to warrant
the conclusion that women or blacks have suffered specifically from a post-
Act practice, covered under the law. Clearly, in this plant, many new
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employment and promotion opportunities have arisen during the 1973 to 1976
period alone. Because of restrictions on transfer rights and the presence
of segregated johs, incumbent "blacks and women could never even he con-
sidered for some of these jobs.
As has been mentioned previously, there was considerable employment
growth from January 1, 1973 to March 1976. In December. 1972, forty-two
percent of the workforce were women. By March 1976, they constituted
only thirty-five percent of the workforce. Sixty-seven percent of all new
hires during the intervening years were non-minority males. They were
responsible for desegregating one all-female unit and reducing the racial
and sexual imbalances in twelve others.
Eleven of the thirteen all-male units had also experienced employment
growth. White males comprised thirty-eight of the forty-one new hires in
these units. One of the seven seniority units that excluded blacks in
1976 was a newly created all-white female unit which had not existed in
December 1972. Three of the remaining six all-white units experienced
some employment growth and all of these new jobs went to white males.
Since transfers are restricted across units, incumbent blacks and
women were not able to take advantage of these openings. While white
male new hires may have changed the race and sex composition of certain
low-wage units, their presence did not improve the economic position of
the more senior women and blacks situated there. Permitting transfers
to new jobs in other, higher wage seniority units, however, would have
improved their promotion opportunities.
Not all blacks or women were confined to low-wage units. Some had
been assigned to relatively tall ladders and the employment opportunities
in these units expanded in the 1973-76 period as well. One needs to
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examlne whether the women and blacks in these units were able to take
advantage of the higher wage opportunities compared to white men with the
same seniority status. In any case, there has certainly been sufficient
post-Act growth in employment and promotion opportunities occurring in these
three years alone to show that incumbent black and female workers could
still be suffering from post-Act discriminatory effects as a result of a
seniority system initiated sometime before the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act.
The question remains whether the seniority unit classification scheme
is "rational," though segregated. The seniority units in this plant are
not departmental in scope, nor are they all, strictly speaking, occupa-
tionally-related job clusters. There are some units that appear to have
only occupationally-related jobs, where an individual progresses in a skill
sequence. In other cases, skill-related jobs are separated into two or
more different units. For example, a certain type of assembly job is
found at the top of one low-wage ladder, and constitutes the entry-level
position at the same wage rate in another unit . In another case , one
"unit" consists of a single job, not a job ladder! There are so many job
classifications in which job titles are similar but not exactly the same
as others that the logic behind the classification scheme is not at all
apparent. The available case material suggests that there is no consistent
application of any one type of seniority unit classification system in
effect at this plant and there is no particular industry-wide pattern
which supports its continued use . The fact that there are interrupted
job sequences and a pattern of segregation is indicative of a discrimina-
tory system within the meaning of the Teamsters ruling in this case.
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IV . A Structural Model of the Wage Determination Process
For production workers in an industrial plant, wages are assumed to
be fixed, that is, attached to jobs. An individual's initial job assign-
ment provides access to a certain set of promotion opportunities in the
plant. Once this assignment occurs, if one assumes that woi^cers cannot
make lateral transfers across seniority units, then it follows that the
only way a worker can increase his/her hourly wage relative to others in
the plant is by getting a promotion to a higher wage job. Promotions are
assumed to be strongly related to seniority status within a given unit.
According to the contract, seniority is defined as years of experience in
the plant. Thus, once seniority unit assignment is controlled for, one
woiild expect wages to be a function of years of experience in the plant.
Seniority units in this plant have a number of characteristics which
seem to be related to wage opportunities. The wage of the entry-level job,
the height of the job ladder, the density, and the sex and race composition
of the unit have all been identified as structural features of the seniority
system which are related to higher- or lower-wage job opportunities in the
plant. In this model, I propose measures for each of these characteristics.
To examine whether women or black are treated unequally, race and sex
interaction terms are also included. The hypotheses being tested are of
three types: l) do the structural variables included in the model have
their expected effects on the wages of individuals? 2) do structural
features of the system have a different impact on blacks' or women's wages
than they do on whites' or men's? and 3) once seniority unit characteris-
tics are controlled for, is there any evidence that blacks or women pro-
gress at slower rates than whites or men for the same years of experience?
A formal description of the mode], and the variables included in it, follows.
-31-
For each worker, in job, and seniority unit .,
1 "^ k J
WAGE.j^ = f(EXPERIENCE^
,
EXPERIENCE^^ , DENSITY^., ENTRY^
.,
RANGE.
., % FEMALE. ., % BLACK. ., SEX. ^EXPERIENCE, ,ij ij ij 1 i
SEX.*EXPERIENCE,^, RACE. ^EXPERIENCE. , RACE. ^EXPERIENCE. ^,1 i ' 1 i' 1 1 '
SEX.^DENSITY. ., RACE.*DENSITY. ., SEX.*ENTRY. ., race.*BJ3TRY
,1 ij 1 ij 1 ij 1 ij'
SEXi*RANGE.^ , RACE •*RANGE .. , SEX.*% FEMALE.., RACE.*% BLACK..)
where
:
(1) WAGE., = the ith worker's hoiirly wage rate in job, and
(2) EXPERIENCE. = the ith worker's ciimulative years of experience in the
plant, as of March 1976. EXPERIENCE is the indicator of a worker's
seniority status. One would expect that the WAGE-EXPERIENCE relationship
closely approximates an age -earnings profile for the cross-section of
individuals in this plant. Thus, the variable EXPERIENCE is specified
in the quadratic form (EXPERIENCE, EXPERIENCE ), where wages are assumed
to increase with years of experience but at a decreasing rate
.
(3) DENSITY. = 100* N ./N, where N. = the number of workers assigned
to seniority unit., and N=750, the total number of workers employed in the
plant. DENSITY is an indicator of the effect of crowding on promotion
opportunities in the unit. The higher the percentage of the plant's
workforce that is assigned to a unit, the more dense it will be. The
denser the unit, the slower the progression rate is likely to be, and the
harder it is for an individual to get to a higher wage job, ceteris paribus .
(4) ENTRY . = Wage of the entry-level job in seniority unit . . The
higher the wage of the entry job at the bottom of a promotion ladder,
then the higher one can expect the wage opportunities of all jobs in
that unit to be
.
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(5) RANGE. = Wage of the highest paying job in seniority unit, minus
«J J
ENTRY.. This is an indicator of the range of wage opportunities (or length
of ladder) associated with a particular unit . The effect of RANGE on WAGE
is somewhat ambiguous. Both short and tall ladders are associated with
high-wage jobs. However, if the entry-level wage is held constant, the
taller the ladder (or the greater the RANGE), the higher the wage oppor-
tunities associated with that unit will be.
(6) % FEMALE. = 100* F./N., where F . = the number of women in seniority
unit., and N. = the number of workers in seniority unit.. % FEMALE is an
J J J
indicator for how sex-segregated a seniority unit is. The higher the per-
centage of women in a unit, the more likely that unit is to have low-wage
jobs in it. Conversely, the smaller the percentage of women in a unit,
the higher the wages of the individuals in that unit are likely to be.
(?) % BLACK. = 100* B./N., where B. = the number of blacks in seniority
unit., and N. = the number of workers in seniority unit.. % BLACK is an
J J J
indicator for how race-segregated a seniority unit is. The higher the
percentage of blacks in a unit, the more likely it is that the jobs in
that unit will be low-wage
.
(8) SEX^ = [j; j[
'^^^^
if male
(9) RACE. = \l' ^l ^J^f^ ' 1 (_ 0, if white
The major structural variables in the model seem to measure quite
independent characteristics of the seniority system. As shown in Table 2,
the pairwise correlations among these variables are generally quite low.
DENSITY and RANGE are the only two variables with a simple correlation
coefficient greater than .5.
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Table 2; Simple Correlations Among, the Structural Variables
-3^-
V, Regression Results
Using ordinary least squares multiple regression techniques, the
theoretical model presented in the previous section was estimated for all
workers in the plant. Separate regressions were also run for sex and race
stratified samples. For the samples of men and women only, variables
interacted with SEX were excluded from the model. For the regressions
jrun on the samples of blacks and whites, the estimated equations did not
include variables interacted with RACE. The results from these various
regressions are shown in Table 3-
On the whole, a structural model of the wage determination process in
this plant appears to be a good predictor of the individual's wage. Nearly
three-fourths of the variation in wages among all workers in the plant are
explained by the variables included in this model, and all of the struc-
tural variables exert significant effects on WAGE, independent of the
individual's seniority status.
ENTRY, RANGE and DENSITY all have the hypothesized effects on WAGE.
As expected, the higher the wage of the entry-level job in a unit, the
higher will be the wage of anyone assigned to it. The effect seems to
be insensitive to race or sex. Once differences in the entry wage are
removed, the taller the job ladder (i.e., the greater the RANGE), the
higher an individual's expected wage. However, both women and blacks
experience significantly smaller gains from assignment to taller units
than the gains received by men and whites. Crowding (DENSITY) has the
same effect on wages for both black and white workers--the denser the
unit, ceteris paribus , the lower the individual's wage. Men experience
a negative impact from assignment to a more crowded unit, but for women,
there is no effect.
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Once having accounted for the basic staructural featuxes of this
seniority system--as measured here hy ENTRY, RANGE and DENSITY--there
is no reason to expect that the sex or race composition of any seniority
unit would have any fvirther independent effect on wages. Yet that is
precisely what I find. For all workers, expected wage is lower, the
greater the percentage of blacks or women in the unit. Women are less
adversely affected from assignment to units with higher percentages of women
in them than are men. On the other hand, black workers in "blacker" units
do no worse (and no better) than white workers in such units.
Thus, we seem to have direct evidence of race and sex discrimination
in the structure of the seniority unit classification system itself.
Moreover, even after all of this complex structure is held constant,
women in the system still (as in figure l) receive lower returns to years
of experience in the plant than do men. There is no comparable differential
for blacks vis-a-vis whites, once we have corrected for structure.
The resiilts from the race and sex stratified equations generally
confirm these findings. There are, however, some interesting wi thin-
group differences worth mentioning. Among men, an individual assigned
to a unit with a high percentage of blacks or women will have a lower
expected wage, ceteris paribus , than a man assigned to a unit that is
nearly all-white or all-male. For women, on the other hand, only assign-
ment to a unit with a higher percentage of women matters. A woman who is
assigned to a unit that is mostly female will have a lower wage than a
woman in a unit where the percentage of women is very small. There is
no significant decrease in wage, for women, the greater the percentage
of blacks in a unit. Women in units with high percentages of blacks do
no worse (and no better) than women in units where the black percentage
-36-
is low.
The differences "between white and "black women are generally insig-
nificant. Similarly, among "blacks, men and women are treated "by the
system in about the same way. Being black, or being a woman, is what
27
matters. There is no advantage that women experience from assignment
to units that are less crowded or from assignment to units with higher
entry-level wages. Black workers do gain an advantage from being assigned
to units with higher entry-level wages, but (like women) they do not
experience any wage gains from assignment to less crowded units. White
men, when compared to black men or white women in the sex or race
stratified equations, have greater gains from assignment to units with
higher entry-level wages and experience a distinct advantage from assign-
ment to low-density units. In sum, these results suggest that women (of
either race) and blacks (of either sex) are systematically assigned
lower-wage jobs in this system than are white men. These patterns,
taken together, constitute consistent statistical evidence of discrimi-
nation.
VI . Conclusions and Implications
The major findings from this analysis strongly suggest that promo-
tion practices and the seniority system in operation at this plant dis-
criminate against black and women workers. Women and blacks who have
the same seniority status as men and white workers receive significantly
unequal (smaller) benefits from assignment to taller seniority units.
This particular finding supports the inference that there are discrimina-
tory promotion practices at the plant, but it is not sufficient evidence
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to infer that the overall seniority system is discriminatory as well.
Low-density units represent a high-wage "shelter" for white men,
who, as a result, do not face as much competitive joh bidding on the
basis of seniority status as do women or blacks, for whom these shelters
do not exist. This finding indicates that the seniority system does
indeed provide benefits to white males not afforded to women or blacks.
Under the disparate impact rule of the Griggs decision, such evidence
would have been siifficient to permit an inference that the seniority
system is discriminatory in effect. But disparate impact is not suf-
ficient evidence under the recent Teamsters ruling of the Supreme Court.
Discriminatory Intent in the inception or maintenance of the system must
also be established.
In the wake of the Teamsters decision, the EEOG provides the only
guidance as to what might constitute discriminatory intent. Where there
is some historical evidence of segregation within the bargaining unit,
the fact that substantially sex-or race-segregated units exist Post-Act
is sixfficient proof of discriminatory intent when there is also additional
evidence that women or blacks are adversely affected by the system.
In fact, the resiilts of our statistical tests provide even stronger
evidence than this. Independent of any bona fide structural feature of
the seniority system (and any disparate impacts which might explain away
the lower wages of blacks and women), units with high percentages of blacks
or women have been shown to represent significantly lower-wage opportunities
for all workers assigned to them. This finding is the most definitive
evidence available that the seniority system is discriminatory.
Thus, not only are blacks and women adversely affected by the
seniority system and by discriminatory promotion practices, but the degree
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of race and sex segregation in the seniority unit classification system
has been shown to "be an important indicator that the seniority system is
not bona fide , but illegally discriminatory as well.
There are, however, some questions this data analysis does not answer.
From the case material available, there is not enough information to de-
termine if the classification system in effect at the plant is "rational"
or not. If the classification scheme could be shown to be efficient and
consistent with the practices of other employers in the industry, but, at
the same time, not tainted by a discriminatory purpose, then it might prove
to be "rational" and thus, bona fide. When there is an historic pattern
of segregation within a bargaining unit, however, discriminatory intent
can be inferred. Thus, the question of whether or not the seniority system
is rational may become moot when considered against the weight of the evi-
dence in this case.
There is no way of telling from the available data if sex or race
biases in job evaluation techniques are, in part, responsible for the
lower wages of blacks and women in the plant. If such biases exist and are
sufficiently large, a re-evaluation of the affected jobs could equalize
wages between male and female workers, or between black and white workers
in the plant. Without changes in the seniority rules, however, there
would still be unequal employment opportunities by race and sex.
In the post-1972 period, the company embarked on a hiring policy which
altered the sex composition of the plant's workforce. By 1976, women repre-
sented a smaller percentage of the workforce than they had in December 1972.
"Affirmative action" hiring at the plant during this period has meant in
large measure the substitution of white men for white women in traditionally
female job classifications. This hiring policy has not improved the position
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of women in the plant. The weight of the evidence in the case sijggests
that women, in fact, are adversely affected by the seniority system and
promotion practices at the plant in more different ways than are blacks.
The company's hiring policy has only served to mask these effects to the
casual observer.
Actual wage differences among the various sex and race groups in the
plant's woifcforce are not very large. Indeed, the lace and sex differences
observed in this case are the smallest among all the plants of this em-
ployer for which data were available. The findings of significant dis-
criminatory patterns have broader implications in this context. If this
plant represents the least discriminatory case, then a similar analysis
of any one of the other plants of this employer should yield even more
powerful results than those presented here
.
This paper demonstrates that structural features of the internal
labor market can be measured and tested for discriminatory effects. The
approach followed here can be applied more generally to any complex work
organization where formal riiles play an important part in regulating the
flow of individuals to different jobs. The fact that the data were
available from the company in a format amenable to the statistical
techniques used here is also an important finding in and of itself. It
suggests that firms with computerized personnel files have the type of
data in an accessible format for measuring the extent and type of dis-
crimination in employment practices. Systematic evaluation of this type
of data collected by large employers seems the most fruitful approach
for the EEOC to piirsue in class action cases.
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Ta"ble A-1; Mean Wages and Standard Deviations by Race and Sex
Men Women
White
Black
$5,021
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Table A-3; Hypothesis Tests for the Parameters Estimated
in the Structural Model of Wa^e Determination for
the Plant as a Whole
Variable Name
Structural Variables
ENTRY
RANGE
DENSITY
% FEMALE
% BLACK
SEX*ENTRY
SEX*RANGE
SEX*DENSITY
SEX* % FEMALE
RAGE*ENTRY
RACE*RANGE
RACE*DENSITY
RACE* % BLACK
Null Hypothesis:



